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Chapter 1: Introduction
The majority of philosophers, even those considered to be among the greats, will never
make it out of the arcane labyrinth of academia and into the discourse of the general population.
Despite the prevalence of this philosophical fate, it is not the case for one eighteenth century
German philosopher: you will find his influence in every Ethics 101 class, in a popular party
game called “Trial by Trolley,” and even in the popular TV show “The Good Place.” I am, of
course, talking about Immanuel Kant. The level of popularity that Kant has achieved among the
general population is quite rare, only to be outdone in recognizability and influence by the likes
of the great Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle. Additionally, the predominance of his
influence is made even more astounding when one realizes that his work is much less accessible
than that of his counterparts. Nevertheless, the influence of Kant—most notably in the fields of
ethics and philosophy of religion—has persisted, and that influence is not without justification.
Immanuel Kant is arguably the most important philosopher of the modern era. There is
certainly no question that he is one of the most influential philosophers, both of his time and
throughout the history of philosophy, but Kant’s influence is as recognized among his critics as it
is among his fans. Even Nietzsche cites Kant as one of the three philosophers who influenced
him the most (albeit in opposition to Kant). In the introduction to his work A Kant Dictionary,
Howard Caygill sums up Kant’s influence when he says:
The influence of Kant’s philosophy has been, and continues to be, so profound and so
widespread as to have become imperceptible. Philosophical inquiry within both the
‘analytic’ and the ‘continental’ traditions is unthinkable without the lexical and
conceptual resources bequeathed by Kant. Even outside philosophy, in the humanities,
social sciences, and natural sciences, Kantian concepts and structures of argument are
ubiquitous. Anyone practicing literary or social criticism is contributing to the Kantian
tradition; anyone reflecting on the epistemological implication of their work will find
themselves doing it within the parameters established by Kant. Indeed, many
contemporary debates, whether in aesthetics, literary or political theory, show a peculiar
tendency to mutate into disputes in Kant exegesis. All in all, in the less than 200 years
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since the death of its author, Kantian philosophy has established itself as an indispensable
point of intellectual orientation. (Caygill 1995, 1)
The point that Caygill is trying to make here is that Kant’s influence, while great in the field of
philosophy, goes far beyond philosophy and into many other disciplines. One of the biggest
influences that Kant has had outside of the field of philosophy is within religion. Michael Rohlf,
writes in his entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that Kant proved that “scientific

knowledge, morality, and religious belief are mutually consistent and secure” through the
arguments laid out in his ethical and religious theories (Rohlf 2020). Kant’s importance to the

field of religion as a form of critical academic discourse can not be overstated, yet the
discussion of Kant’s religious theory has really been restrained to discussing it either in the
context of Christianity or secularism. There have been a few scholars who have explored
Kant within the context of religion more broadly, but the scholarship is relatively limited in
comparison to what is available in the “big two” camps with regard to Kant. It is within this
context that I chose to write this thesis, which will explore Kant’s ethical and religious theory
through a different lens.
In this thesis, I will look at the relationship between Kant’s ethical theory and his theory
of religion. This thesis aims to explore two major issues: what metaphysical assumptions

Kant’s ethical theory commits him to, and what those commitments mean for a comparison
between Kant’s ideal religion and the forms of religion that exist in the world today.
Specifically, I will focus on the metaphysical assumptions that underlie Kant’s ethical theory and
compare them with the metaphysical assumptions of two specific religions: Buddhism and
Christianity. In order to do this, I will start with an exegesis of Kant’s ethical theory, in which I
will specifically explore the concepts of a good will, duty, and the categorical imperative. Kant’s
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ethical theory, often referred to as deontology, is the most well known area of his work among
the general population. When Kant is being discussed in board games and TV shows, they are
talking about his ethical theory. Although an understanding of the general principles of
deontology is useful, understanding that deontology generally means “doing the right thing for
the right reason” is not sufficient for the purposes of this thesis: the specifics of the good will,
duty, and the categorical imperative are necessary in order to lay the groundwork for the analysis
of Kant’s metaphysics and religious theory that will come next. In the third chapter, I will lay out
the three metaphysical assumptions that Kant claims are necessary to his ethical theory (he calls
these the necessary postulates of pure practical reason): freedom, immortality, and God.
Additionally, in this chapter I will look at the relationship between Christianity and Kant’s theory
as he discusses it in his work: this will include an analysis of the role of Jesus Christ according to
Kant—as an ideal moral person. In the fourth and final chapter I will do two things. First, I will
analyze how the concepts of freedom, immortality, and God, as laid out by Kant, compare to
similar conceptions in Christianity and Buddhism. With Christianity, this will be rather
straightforward, although I will argue that the Christian idea of heaven and hell is not compatible
with Kant’s concepts of freedom and immortality. The comparison to Buddhism is a bit more
complicated, but ultimately I will illustrate that karma can replace Kant’s conception of God,
rebirth can replace immortality, and the conception of freedom is similar for both Kant and
Buddhism. Second, I will explore how Kant, Christianity, and Buddhism understand the role of
religion in cultivating ethical people. It is generally assumed, and indeed said by Kant himself,
that Christianity is the closest existing religion to his theoretical ideal religion. While the
metaphysical elements of both religions make a strong case in favor of Buddhism, the discussion
of cultivating ethical people seals the deal. I will argue that Kant’s support for Christianity on
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moral grounds is rooted in a misunderstanding of the relationship between justification and
salvation. I will also argue that Buddhism shares a similar goal with Kant regarding the role of
religion in cultivating moral persons, and that at the root of each is the idea of increasing
individual autonomy. Ultimately, I will argue two things in the final chapter of this thesis: first,
that Christianity is a poor fit for Kant’s ideal religion, and second that Buddhism is the closest
existing religion to Kant’s ideal religion.
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Chapter 2: An Exegesis of Kant’s Ethical Theory
I.

Introduction
Kant’s ethical theory is based on a concept called pure practical reason. Kant does not

consider moral philosophy to be an issue of pure reason itself, because he believes that it has an
empirical part (Kant 1988, 10). In order for something to be considered pure, he argues, it must
“deliver its doctrine from a priori principles alone” (Kant 1988, 10). In other words, in order for
something to be pure it must be entirely separate from experience. However, pure practical
reason deals with how humans can act morally, and morality cannot be separated from human
experience. Morality is concerned with the “laws of the human will, so far as it is affected by
nature” (Kant 1988, 10). Humans exist as beings that are affected by nature, so they cannot be
separated from the empirical. The empirical, or experienced, world includes both what is and
what ought to be, and moral philosophy is concerned with “laws according to which everything
ought to happen” (Kant 1988, 10). In other words, pure practical reason is when reason is applied
to what ought to happen in the world. Kant lays out the basis of his theory through an
explanation of a few key concepts and their connection to one another. The three most
fundamental of these concepts are a good will, duty, and the categorical imperative.
II.

Good Will
The first concept that is important to understand in Kant's philosophy is what he calls a

good will. The definition of a good will is quite self explanatory: a will that is good. More
specifically, a good will is will that is aligned with the moral law. Many ethical theories focus on
finding what is referred to as the supreme or highest good; in more common terms, the idea of a
supreme good can be understood as the goal or purpose for which other ethical actions are done.
Kant’s ethical theory is rooted in the idea that the supreme good is a good will. Kant explains
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that “nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good
without qualification, except a good will” (Kant 1988, 17). The point that he is making here is
twofold. First, he is establishing the supremacy of a good will: nothing else is equivalent to
(hence its title as the supreme good). Second, he is saying that the goodness of this good will
does not come from some external factor or measurement of goodness. He further explains this
idea when he says that a good will is good “not because of what it performs or effects” but
because “it is good in itself” (Kant 1988, 18). At first, this seems like a difficult concept to grasp.
In day to day life, it seems like one is often making decisions about how to act based on the good
consequences that the actions will result in. However, Kant argues that this idea of a good will is
actually intuitive. He says that a good will is “a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for
itself, and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound
natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in
estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place, and constitutes the condition of
all of the rest” (Kant 1988, 21). Here, Kant is trying to establish that people already have the idea
of a good will and judge their actions based on this inner sense; in other words, people have an
idea about what is right and wrong and that idea doesn’t always line up with consequences.
During day to day events, one can hear people talk about what the right thing to do is, even when
that right thing results in bad consequences. For example, someone might choose to tell the truth
in a court case, even if it leads to them going to jail. Despite knowing what the right thing to do
is, people may not always act based on their sense of what is right, but they still have a sense of
what is right and they have to choose to act against it in order to do immoral things.
Although Kant posits that a good will does not need qualification, he does provide
justification for how we can know that it is the supreme good. His argument is that if the ultimate
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goal of human life were happiness, we would be governed by instinct rather than reason (Kant
1988, 19). He lays this argument out by establishing a few key points. First, he argues, “we
assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also
the fittest and best adapted for that purpose” (Kant 1988, 19). In other words, all natural things
are designed so that they best achieve their purpose; a bird's wings are excellent at flying, a bat’s
eyes can see in the dark because they live in caves, etc. The next part of his argument claims that
humans being governed by instinct would better guarantee happiness than being governed by
reason (Kant 1988, 19). This idea is rather easy to grasp; people often muse about how much
more blissful it would be to be an animal, constantly giving in to every instinctual desire. Yet,
despite the supposed appeal of such a life, this is not how humans act. The reason for this is
explained in Kant’s next point, when he argues that humans are governed by reason above
instinct (Kant 1988, 19). This simply means that humans choose reason over instinct when
making decisions. So far, Kant has established that natural organisms are designed in order to
best achieve their purpose, that instinct would better achieve happiness than reason, and that
nonetheless humans are governed by reason. Thus, he concludes that the purpose, or ultimate
goal, of human life is not happiness.
The previous argument has established that happiness is not the ultimate goal of human
life, but Kant has still not yet proven that a good will is the ultimate goal of human life. Thus, he
must continue on with his justification. Reason is often contra happiness, so the only way to
justify the predominance of reason is to posit that humans have a different teleology. Kant
explains that the use of reason, “especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the
use of it,” often makes people “find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their
shoulders” and “they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common stamp of men

9
who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct” (Kant 1988, 20). Kant’s point here is rather
simple and intuitive; in everyday terms, this is referred to as the dilemma between being a happy
fool or a troubled genius. Another common phrase is: ignorance is bliss. Ignoring reason and
indulging in instinctual desires when making decisions seems to consistently result in more
happiness for the person making those decisions. Kant does not deny this—in fact, it was the
point of his previous argument. However, despite all of this, some people still think that reason is
good. Kant describes this feeling that reason is good despite its inconveniences when he says
“there lies at the root of these judgements the idea that our existence has a different and far
nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must,
therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must, for the
most part, be postponed” (Kant 1988, 20). The point he is making here is that our sense that we
should prefer reason despite its problems does not exist for no reason. We prefer reason because
some part of us knows that the purpose of human life is not mere happiness; it is something more
than that, it is a good will. Kant goes on to make the point that reason is a good way to achieve a
good will; if reason is the means, then a good will must be the ends. Kant explains this when he
says that:
As reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects and the
satisfaction of all our wants (which to some extent it even multiplies), this being an end
to which an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since,
nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e. as one which is to have
greater influence on the will, therefore admitting that nature generally in the distribution
of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce
a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason
was absolutely necessary. (Kant 1988, 20-21)
In more simple language: natural organisms are designed in such a way that their preferences
align with their purpose, humans prefer reason over instinct, but reason is not a good way to
achieve happiness, reason is a good way to achieve a good will, therefore, the purpose of human
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existence is to achieve a good will. This is a teleological explanation of the human capacity for
reason. Kant says that humans have reason so that they can eventually align themselves with a
good will. This explanation, with reason as the means and a good will as the ends, raises the
question of how we can know that a good will isn’t just an intermediary means to achieving
some other end. Kant explains that the potential other positive end “could have been also brought
about by other causes, so that there would have been no need of the will of a rational being… it
is in this alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found” (Kant 1988, 26). The
point here is that other things, besides reason, could achieve any other potential ends, so that
can’t be the purpose of reason. Reason is the only way to achieve a good will. Other ends can be
achieved through other means that are more effective than reason at achieving those ends. For
example, Kant's previous argument shows that instinct is the best way to achieve happiness.
Reason is most effective at achieving good will. If a good will were only an intermediary end,
then humans would show a preference for whatever would help them achieve the final end. The
human preference for reason and reason’s particular effectiveness at achieving a good will makes
it clear that a good will is the final end.
III.

Duty
Up until this point, this chapter has discussed Kant’s conception of what he calls the

supreme good, or a good will. Kant says that a good will, “though not indeed the sole and
complete good, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the desire of
happiness” (Kant 1988, 21). The fact that a good will is the supreme good has already been
established, but Kant introduces a new concept here, which is what he calls the complete good. A
good will is not the complete good. The complete good is what Kant refers to as duty. Duty
includes a good will, but it is more than that. This is why duty is called the complete good. Kant
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says that in order to understand the complete good “we will take the notion of duty, which
includes that of a good will, although implying subjective restrictions and hindrances” (Kant
1988, 21). In other words, the term duty refers to the incentive to act in accordance with a good
will. Specifically, it is the feeling of inclination to act in accordance with a good will out of a
sense of commitment to or respect for the moral law, rather than as a result of some other type of
inclination. An action that is done in accordance with and from duty is considered a moral action.
Kant explains that an action is not moral if it is done “as duty requires...but not because duty
requires” (Kant 1988, 22). If someone performs an action “not from inclination or fear, but from
duty—then his maxim has moral worth” (Kant 1988, 22). In other words, a moral action cannot
just conform with duty but be done from some inclination. A moral action is an action that is
taken because it is the right thing to do. It is not an action that is taken because it will have good
consequences that just happens to be the right thing to do. Kant gives an example of this in the
case of a merchant. The merchant has honest business practices. These honest business practices
benefit the salesperson because they make people want to shop with this salesperson. These
honest business practices also align with the moral law. The difference lies in why the
salesperson has these honest business practices. If they have honest practices because it is the
right thing to do, then having them is a morally good action. If they have honest business
practices because they are beneficial to their business then the action is not morally wrong, it is
just morally neutral with beneficial consequences—it is not a moral action so it does not have
moral worth (Kant 1988, 22). A key point here is that Kant’s theory does not mean that all
actions that are taken for reasons other than following the moral law are bad. Those actions just
do not have any moral worth. In simple terms, people do not get moral points for performing an
action that just happens to be in accordance with the moral law when the moral law is not the
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reason that they take that action. Additionally, not all actions and choices are moral in nature.
People will have inclinations, and it is preferable that those inclinations are beneficial in a
practical way. For example, it is preferable that a person have an inclination to eat salad rather
than candy. Other actions (such as eating) are not bad, they just have no moral worth. They can
even be good in the everyday use of the word, meaning that they are beneficial, and not good in
the moral sense, but they are morally neutral (Kant 1988, 23). Kant explains that it is a positive
thing for people to have inclinations to do these beneficial actions, and that they “deserve praise
and encouragement, but not esteem” because esteem should be reserved for actions that are good
in the moral sense (Kant 1988, 23). According to Kant, the issue of doing things for reasons that
aren’t related to the moral law, like positive consequences, is simply a discussion that ought to
exist outside the bounds of ethics. Of course, it is bad to do things that contradict the moral law,
but actions that are aligned with the moral law and are done for other reasons are just not issues
of ethical concern. Kant’s ethical theory is focused much more on the why of moral actions than
the what. Kant views this as a good thing, since a moral theory focused on the moral law is much
more consistent than one that is based on something as inconsistent as consequences.
Nonetheless, his focus on the why of moral actions does cause some dilemmas for Kant.
IV.

Grounding for the Moral Law
Kant establishes that a good will is the supreme good and that duty is the complete good.

This creates a problem for Kant because it is basically impossible to find an example of an action
done purely out of duty. Even if such an action did exist, it would be impossible for anyone else
to know that action was done purely out of duty (Kant 1988, 33-34). So there is no empirical
evidence upon which to ground Kant’s ethical theory. One can not see people acting on the basis
of duty. At this point, it seems like there are some major problems with Kant’s ethical theory. He
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himself argues that there are few or no examples of actions done purely out of duty, which makes
it seem like his ethical theory is impossible to follow. Additionally, he also points out that it is
seemingly impossible to prove his theory through empirical experience because, even on the off
chance that it actually happened, it would be impossible to know if an action was done purely out
of duty. Kant, however, does not view these things as problems for his theory. He argues that it is
not possible to derive moral laws from experience. Here, it is important to have a basic
understanding of what Kant means by the concept of a moral law. Laws are rules for action that
are universal, they apply to all rational beings (Kant 2002, 29). A moral law is a rule about
morality that is universal, it applies to all rational beings. This universalizability is what causes
the issue with concluding moral laws from experience. Empirical experiences exist within a
specific set of individual circumstances and it is highly unlikely that anyone else will experience
those exact same circumstances. And it is definitely the case that those specific circumstances
will not apply to everyone, so they cannot be the basis on which moral laws that are supposed to
apply to everyone can be formulated (Kant 1988, 34). Kant further justifies his argument for why
moral laws cannot be based on experience in the Critique of Practical Reason (hereafter
abbreviated CPR). In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant introduces a concept that he refers to
as pure reason.
Kant argues that the existence of a moral law is based on an assumption of the existence
of pure reason, or reason separate from empirical experiences, because if people are being
motivated by empirical experiences they are actually acting based on maxims rather than laws
(Kant 2002, 29). Kant further explains the distinction between laws and maxims by saying that
laws cannot be based on desiring some thing, while maxims can be based on desire (Kant 2002,
32). The reason for this is that desiring a thing is based on an empirical experience of that thing
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and whether it causes pleasure, pain, etc. Empirical experiences are unique to each person, so
desire for some thing can’t be universal. This idea that empirical experiences are unique to each
person can seem a little off-putting at first. On a basic level, it seems like fire would always
cause pain and chocolate cake would always cause pleasure. However, human psychology and
physiology is more complicated than that. Even if being burned by fire usually causes pain, some
masochists might enjoy it, and even among average people the experience of the level of pain
would be different. All humans experience things slightly differently because of their
uniqueness, so they will not desire or avoid the same things or to the same degree. The
implication of all of this is that laws, needing to be universally applicable, cannot be based on
anything empirical. Kant goes on to contrast the concept of laws with the concept of material
practical principles, or maxims. He says that all maxims are based on self love (Kant 2002, 34).
In other words, people want things because they want happiness, and the desire for happiness is
rooted in self love. It is important to understand here that Kant is not just referring to desire in
the sense that it is usually associated with (food, sex, etc.), he also means more sophisticated
types of desire. He explains that there is not a difference between lower pleasures that are rooted
in senses and higher pleasures which are rooted in understanding, they are still all based on
sensibility because they are based on experiencing pleasure (Kant 2002, 34-35). Sensibility here
just means that they exist within the realm of empirical experience. In other words, according to
Kant, pleasure from doing drugs or from doing math are still fundamentally the same, because
they are pleasures that are derived from empirical experience. Pleasure can only be experienced
by sensibilities and it is based on being a living being existing in the realm of sensibility. This
connection between experience and pleasure is important for understanding why empirical
experience cannot tell us anything significant about the moral law. Every rational and finite
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being necessarily desires happiness. Kant explains that because humans are finite we have needs
that we have to satisfy and we are always striving to fulfill our needs; ultimately, happiness is
simply having our needs satisfied, and therefore experiencing pleasure and not pain (Kant 2002,
38). Another way to understand this is that as biological organisms we have a basic drive to
satisfy our needs in order to survive. Thus, the basic drive of any organism is getting things that
are pleasurable and get rid of things that are unpleasurable. Pleasurable things, like food or sex,
lead to survival, while painful things, like hunger and injury, lead to death. Kant makes a point
here to clarify that this motivation for happiness does not constitute a law in his sense of the
word. It is not a law because what causes happiness in each person varies from person to person.
He explains that “a law that is subjectively necessary (as a law of nature) is objectively a very
contingent practical principle that can and must be very different in different subjects” (Kant
2002, 38). While everyone desires happiness, the method of achieving this varies from person to
person. Thus, Kant draws a distinction between laws of nature and laws of pure practical reason
(moral laws). Laws of nature are in the realm of sense, and their reliance on experience makes
this subjective. Laws of pure practical reason, or moral laws, must be universalizable, so they
cannot be based on experience
Kant has thus argued that moral laws that apply to everyone cannot be based on empirical
experiences, so he must provide an alternative basis for them. Kant argues that morality should
be based on a priori moral concepts (Kant 1988, 35). A priori concepts are those things which
can be understood through reason alone, without the need for experience. This is where the
concept of pure reason that he talks about in CPR comes in, he says in CPR that “pure reason is
practical by itself alone and gives (to human beings) a universal law, which we call the moral
law” (Kant 2002, 46). In other words, the moral law comes from pure reason alone and does not
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need help from anything else, such as empirical experience. Kant is arguing here that moral
truths can be discovered through the use of reason and logic, rather than through seeing moral
actions play out in the world. One example of this that Kant gives is the idea of God. Humanity’s
idea of God is based on an a priori conception of moral perfection, not on experience (Kant
1988, 36). The point that Kant is making about morality is that humans are able to figure out
what is right and wrong simply through the use of reason. This is what he meant when he said
that morality requires “rather to be cleared up than to be taught” (Kant 1988, 21). Humans
already have an innate ability to know right from wrong, the point of philosophy is simply to
make that clearer. One way to help make the moral law clearer is to provide a simple concept
that people can reference in order to make sure that their actions align with the moral law. Kant
calls this concept the categorical imperative.
V.

Categorical Imperative
Kant argues that people can choose to align their will with reason, or with their instincts

and desire. Each of these things influences different practical principles that people use to make
decisions. Practical principles are basically sets of principles that people hold that serve as the
basis for how they handle and reason through specific situations. Kant says that there are two
types of practical principles, which have been discussed in a different context previously. These
are maxims and laws. Maxims are subjective, they are based on desire and are only valid for the
will of the individual who holds them. This is because of Kant’s point about how people
experience things differently and different things bring them happiness, so they have different
desires and therefore different maxims. Laws are universal, they are valid for the will of all
rational beings. In other words, maxims and laws differ with regard to the justification for why
someone is performing that action. Maxims are specific to individuals, they are about what that
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specific person wants. For example, a person would state a maxim using the format: “I am doing
q because…” Laws are universal statements about why people should take a certain action. A
format for a law might be: “Everyone should do t because…” Maxims and laws are about why
people should perform certain actions. Kant also has a concept called imperatives, which are
about what actions people should take. Specifically, Kant says that imperatives are the actions
that one should take in alignment with reason (Kant 1988, 40). Imperatives are rules of action.
There are two types of imperatives: hypothetical and categorical (Kant 1988, 41). Hypothetical
imperatives are about what a person needs to do in order to achieve some desired end other than
morality. Categorical imperative have to do with moral actions, they are about what one must do
in order to align their actions with the moral law. Hypothetical imperatives can be formatted like
this: “If a person wants x ( where x is some desired end besides morality), that person should do
y.” Categorical imperatives always apply to everyone, they can be formatted: “Everyone must
always do z.” Needless to say, hypothetical imperatives are not particularly relevant to ethics. It
is categorical imperatives that the field of ethics is concerned with. Categorical imperatives
provide the clarification of the moral law which Kant claims is what philosophy ought to concern
itself with. There are three formulations of the categorical imperative. The first formulation is the
idea that one ought to only perform an action which they would wish to be willed into a universal
law (Kant 1988, 49). One way that Kant phrases this is “act that the maxim of your will could
always hold at the same time as a principle of a universal legislation” (Kant 2002, 45). The
action needs to be universalizable. In other words, a person needs to think about whether they
would want everyone to always take the action that they are about to take. If they would not want
that, then the action isn’t moral. It is easy to determine if a maxim is universalizable using
common understanding (Kant 2002, 40-41). Apply that maxim to the case in which one would
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like to use it and then see if that action would be universalizable. For example, it could not be a
universal maxim that one should lie. If that rule were universalized (if everyone always lied all
of the time) it would make it impossible to have any type of functioning society or human
interaction. The second formulation of the categorical imperative is that rational beings are an
end in themselves and should never be treated merely as a means (Kant 1988, 58). This basically
means that it is not morally acceptable to just use people to achieve something. Sometimes
people are used to achieving something, but morality requires that their dignity and rationality is
also respected. An example to clarify the difference is that it would not be okay to order a group
of slaves to go into battle in order to win some war. They do not have a choice in the matter and
therefore their rationality is not being respected, they are just being used as cannon fodder.
However, it would be okay to send a group of soldiers into battle who had willingly signed up
and understood and accepted the risk. They are still being used to win the war, so they are being
used as means, but they are not being used merely as a means; their dignity and rationality have
been respected because they are making a free choice. This formulation makes it clear that
respect for the dignity of all human beings is a requirement of morality. The final formulation of
the categorical imperative is what Kant refers to as the “kingdom of ends” (Kant 1988, 62). The
basic idea here is that people should act in such a way that if their actions were to be ruled into
universal laws in some theoretical utopian society, that society would be one that treated people
as ends in themselves. The key difference between the second formulation of the categorical
imperative and the third is that the second is about how to treat individuals, while the third is
about what type of society it would be ideal to live in. The kingdom of ends is not the way the
world actually works, but in theory, if everyone acted perfectly in accordance with the moral law
then it would be how the world looked. The use of the terminology “kingdom of ends” here is
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interesting because it sounds very similar to the term “kingdom of God.” This is a small hint of
the connection between morality and religion that is key to Kant’s ethical theory. This connection
will be the subject of the rest of this thesis.
VI.

Conclusion
Kant’s ethical theory focuses on three major concepts. These concepts are a good will,

duty, and the categorical imperative. The justification for these three concepts is rooted in the
idea that people are rational beings. The idea that people are rational beings, while seemingly
intuitive, should not be taken for granted. This seemingly fundamental concept of rationality is
actually based on something even more fundamental: the idea of freedom. Freedom is one of the
key assumptions that underlies Kant’s ethical theory, however it is not the only assumption.
Kant’s ethical theory is based upon many assumptions that are necessary in order for it to be
consistent. These assumptions have to do with the metaphysical, so they indicate the overlap
between Kant’s ethical theory and his theory of religion. The next chapter of this thesis will deal
with Kant’s theory of religion, so it will discuss these assumptions. Additionally, it will discuss
other aspects of Kant’s theory of religion that are foundational to his theory of ethics.
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Chapter 3: An Exegesis of Kant’s Theory of Religion
I.

Introduction
As the previous section of this thesis discussed, Kant argues for a concept called pure

practical reason as the basis of his ethical theory. The implications of this pure practical reason
are laid out in his ethical theory. Kant argues that this concept of pure practical reason requires
three necessary assumptions about freedom, immortality, and God. These assumptions will be
the subject of the first half of this section. The second half of this section will deal with Kant’s
thesis on the purposes of religion. Specifically, it will address Kant’s claim that the value of
religion lies solely in its function to make people more ethical. Kant’s discussion of religion in
this context also includes an evaluation of the role of Jesus as a religious figure and the value of
Christianity specifically as it relates to achieving the highest good. In summary, the first part of
this section will deal with the metaphysical claims that Kant makes in order for his theory of
ethics to be consistent—these claims deal with concepts that are usually considered religious in
nature—and the second part of the section will deal with the practical aspects of Kant’s theory of
religion—what an ideal religion would look like—and apply this criterion to the case study of
Christianity and its key figure, Jesus.
II.

Freedom
When Kant discusses the concept of freedom he does not necessarily mean it in the

colloquial sense of the word. Oftentimes, freedom is conceived of as a lack of any constraints
and therefore being able to do whatever one pleases. Kant, however, explains that freedom is
when the will is not constrained by natural laws (Kant 2002, 42). People are only able to be fully
free when they are making choices using their rationality, and thus in accordance with the highest
good, rather than being constrained by acting based on their desires and instincts. Kant explains
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this distinction as autonomy versus heteronomy: autonomy is the concept of being self
governing, and in Kant’s case this means that one is acting based on their reason; conversely,
heteronomy is the concept of being restrained by some external force, and in Kant’s case he is
referring to desire and instinct (Kant 1988, 62). This is an important distinction to understand
because the colloquial use of freedom often means the opposite: the common sense conception of
freedom is that freedom means being free of an external constraint (such as a government) so
that one can give in to their own instincts and desires. Kant argues that freedom is what causes a
rational being to act (Kant 1988, 10). According to Kant, a rational being engages in action as a
result of the will; Kant defines the will as “a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar
as they are rational” (Kant 1988, 77). In other words, the will is what causes the rational
individual to engage in the practical part of pure practical reason: the action. Freedom is a
property of the will. An irrational actor has no will, because Kant’s definition of the will assumes
rationality. This concept can tie back to the animals versus humans example used earlier; an
animal is capable of taking actions in order to fulfill certain desires or impulses, but this is not
what Kant means by the concept of a will. When he uses the term will he means the part of a
person’s consciousness that is making choices based on rationality. Rationality requires that
someone is making decisions in accordance with reason, rather than acting based on the
constraints of their desires or interests (Kant 1988, 62). Freedom is the lack of these external
constraints. Thus, freedom is a necessary component of rationality and therefore a necessary
property of the will. Pure practical reason is carried out through the use of the will, thus freedom
is a necessary postulate of it because without freedom there could be no will.
Ultimately, the concept of freedom relates to Kant’s ethical theory because in order to
engage in action that has moral weight one has to be responsible for the choices that they are
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making. If a being does not have the capacity to reason, if they do not have the potential choice
to follow the moral law, then they cannot be held culpable for not following it. The clearest
example of this is the concept of the murder. No one calls it murder when an animal kills another
animal, it is not considered a bad moral choice on the part of the animal, they are simly following
their instincts. However, we do use the idea of murder in reference to humans; this is because
humans have the ability to use reason to choose to follow the moral law. Humans are free, so
they are morally culpable for their actions. Kant argues that freedom and the moral law are the
same thing; this is because acting from anything other than reason restricts one’s freedom (Kant
2002, 43). He goes on to posit that recognizing the moral law is what makes someone realize that
they are free, not the other way around. In other words, a person will not recognize their own
autonomy and then realize that they need to follow the moral law. A person will come to
understand the moral law through the use of reason, and that recognition will lead them to
understand that they are free. The basic argument that Kant is making here is that reason makes
people think about what they ought to do. When we use reason, we think about how we would
feel if other people did the action we are thinking about to us or what would happen if everyone
took this action. This is what Kant means when he talks about an organic recognition of the
categorical imperative. It is important to understand that Kant does not think of his theory as
something that people have to read in order to understand, he believes he is just explaining
something that naturally happens. Once we think about how our actions will affect other people
and the world, we try to justify them; we try to find a reason why it would be okay for anyone
else to take these actions: in doing this, we appeal to universal principles. This process is how
Kant gets from reason to the moral law. The next step is to get to freedom. The conception of
freedom that Kant establishes is negative—it is the lack of being constrained by one's sensual
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impulses—naturally, this means that recognition and adherence to the moral law moves one
closer to freedom by providing an alternative to giving in to sensual impulses—thus, Kant has
now gone from reason all the way to freedom. And when one comes to the recognition that they
are free, they realize that they have dignity. The term dignity here can be understood in the
context of one of the formulations of the categorical imperative mentioned earlier in chapter
two—to treat human beings as an end in themselves and never merely as a means—and basically
means that human life is inherently valuable in a way that objects are not. This conception of
dignity must be rooted in reason because reason is what distinguishes humans from other types
of life. The point that he is making when he posits freedom as a necessary component of pure
practical reason is that part of what gives people dignity is their ability to make choices outside
the limits of the material world, independent of causality.1 Kant takes this concept of
independence from causality even further when he discusses the concepts of an immaterial and
immortal consciousness; these topics will be the subject of the next section.
III.

Immortality
The previous section discussed the fact that freedom means that the will is not

constrained by natural laws; this raises the question of how the will is not constrained by natural
laws when the body is constrained by natural laws. The moral law demands that in order to be
entirely moral one must completely align their own will with the moral law (Kant 2002, 155). In
other words, perfect alignment with the moral law demands that one no longer be subject to the
constraints of their desire and instinct; desire and instinct no longer have an influence on the will.
In order for this conception of the moral law to be worth consideration it has to be possible for
1

Under this conception of reason, reason is not just another mechanical process. In modern terminology, reason
cannot just be a result of chemical processes happening in the brain and neurons firing. If that were the case, reason
would be a physical process and would thus be constrained by the limits of the physical world. This concept will be
addressed further in the next section.
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people to adhere to it (Kant 2002, 155). The basic concept that he is promoting here is that
culpability requires possibility; if it is not possible for someone to achieve something, then they
cannot be held accountable for not achieving it. People cannot be held morally responsible for
not adhering to a moral law that is impossible for them to achieve and a moral theory that is
unachievable does not have any practical ethical value. However, no human is going to be able to
achieve a perfect alignment of their will with the moral law during their lifetime, because they
exist as beings in a sensible world and that puts some constraints on them that makes complete
alignment with the moral law practically impossible (Kant 2002, 155). Although humans have
the capacity for reason that other beings do not, we still have many of the biological
requirements of any living beings: these requirements include things like a sex drive and a need
for food in order to survive. Nonetheless, despite these biological impediments, complete
alignment of the will with the moral law is still the eventual requirement of morality. Thus, one
must consider how this complete alignment could be possible. Kant posits that because the
ultimate object of the will is alignment with the moral law, humans are always making progress
towards it, so given enough time the will will eventually become aligned with the moral law
(Kant 2002, 155). Human lives are finite and relatively short, so the solution for giving people
enough time to become aligned with the moral law is immortality. This conception of continuous
progress towards alignment with the moral law can only happen if it is assumed that what
continues after death is the “existence and personality of the same rational being” (Kant 2002,
155). In other words, Kant’s conception of immortality requires a unified and immaterial
conception of the self. This requirement of Kant is often described as a soul, but it is important to
note that what he means is not necessarily the conception of a soul that practitioners of a religion
such as Christianity believe in; his conception of a soul is best conceived of as an immaterial
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consciousness. The key point here is that Kant argues that complete alignment with the moral
law can eventually be achieved, despite the material restrictions of the sensible world, because
the body and the will are separate and an immaterial consciousness is responsible for the will. In
this sense, the will is not restricted by natural laws because it is not tied to the sense of material
causality in the world. Kant must posit a consciousness that exists outside of material causality
because it makes his theory possible: it allows for the possibility of perfect morality that is not
impeded by the restriction that are placed on beings that exist in the material world by virtue of
their material existence, such as the desire for food or sex. However, the constraints of the
material world are not the only barriers that Kant has to overcome in order for perfect morality
under his theory to be possible; he also has to provide a theory that allows for the necessary
amount of time that it takes for the human will to make the journey towards moral perfection
given the finite nature of human lives. The combination of the concepts of an immaterial
consciousness and immortality solve these issues. Thus, Kant posits immortality as one of the
postulates of pure practical reason in order to make moral perfection a theoretically attainable
possibility.
When Kant postulates freedom and immortality as necessarily postulates of pure practical
reason he is specifically resolving gaps in his moral theory that must be accounted for. Freedom
is not a necessary postulate under a materialist conception of human consciousness that defines it
only as chemical reactions and neural stimulations, and immortality is not a necessary postulate
of human existences without the requirement of aligning one’s will with the highest good. His
final postulate of pure practical reason is a bit different; it does address issues in his theory, but
he also argues that it is necessary in order for the existence of the world, regardless of one’s
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ethical theory, to make sense. In this sense, his final postulate comes the closest to the traditional
idea of religion. This final postulate is God.
IV.

God
God is a necessary postulate of pure practical reason because both nature and the highest

good must have a cause; of course, Kant is making the assumption with this claim that anything
that exists must have a cause. He doesn’t justify this assumption, rather it is simply presumed as
a natural conclusion of reason that causation exists. However, reason does not instantly get to the
conclusion that the cause of nature and the highest good is God, more justification is required for
that claim. Kant proves earlier in his work that the highest good does in fact actually exist in the
world. This concept was discussed extensively in chapter two. The only possible way that the
highest good can exist is if the cause of the world, or nature, “has a causality conforming to the
moral attitude” (Kant 2002, 159). Because Kant has previously proven that the highest good does
in fact exist, then his second statement that the causality of nature conforms to the moral attitude
must also be true. In other words, whatever caused the world must recognize the moral law and
have a will that is aligned with it. In order for the cause of nature to recognize the moral law it
must be rational and in order for it to have a will that is aligned with the moral law it must have a
will. Thus, more simply, Kant’s conception of the cause of nature requires that it is both rational
and has a will. This is a very important point because it means that Kant’s theory of the cause of
the world must be an anthropomorphized conception of God. God must have a consciousness
that operates in some ways similar to that of humans in that God is a rational being and
rationality is the distinguishing characteristic of humanity. Additionally, because the will of God
is aligned with the highest good, God is also all good. This characteristic of God aligns with the
conception of God as omnibenevolent in Judeo-Christian literature. Here, God differs from
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humanity in that God is not constrained by instincts or desires in the same way that humans are.
This connects to the next characteristic of God: Kant argues that because God is the cause of the
world, God must exist outside of the natural world and is therefore free of its constraints (Kant
2002 158). In summary, Kant’s conception of God is fundamentally a morally good and rational
being that exists outside of the natural world.
It is clear when looking at Kant’s postulates of pure practical reason that he is concerned
with the topic of religion in a much different way than a theologian or a scholar of religion would
be. His engagement with the topic of religion is necessary because it ties back to his ethical
theory. Kant’s discussion of the necessary postulates of pure practical reason are religious in that
they are metaphysical in nature and deal with concepts—such as a “soul” and God—that are
usually considered to fall under the umbrella of religion. His discussion of pure practical reason
does not deal with the topic of religion in practice. However, Kant does view the topic of religion
more broadly as important to understand ethics; he just does not view the two topics as one and
the same. The next section of this chapter is going to address what Kant sees as the intersection
between religion and ethics in a practical sense.
V.

The Relationship between Religion and Ethics
Kant proposes a nuanced conception of the relationship between religion and ethics. He

does not claim that morality is derived from religion or from God. The previous section discusses
that God is necessary to his ethical theory, but he claims that God is a being whose will is aligned
with the moral law, not that the moral law is whatever God’s will is. This distinction is important
to understand because it clarifies the direction of causality in the relationship between ethics and
religion that underlies his theory on the subject; religion can be ethical, but that happens if and
only if it is aligned with the moral law. Religion gets its ethical justification from moral
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philosophy, not the other way around. The supremacy of ethics over religion is the first key point
in Kant’s theory of religion. The other major point that this section of the chapter will explore is
that there are some aspects of religion that do align themselves with ethics, and in this way
religion can be a useful tool in cultivating morality. However, no established religion aligns itself
perfectly with the moral law. Christianity will be used as an example of both the possible
positive aspects of religion with respect to ethics, as well as its limitations.
The first step in understanding where Kant believes that religion and ethics do overlap is
to understand the areas where he thinks they do not overlap; particularly in two specific areas.
Kant argues that acting based on the will of God is not reasonable (Kant 1988, 69). This is
confusing at first because the will of God is aligned with the highest good; however, there are
two nuances that clear up this confusion. Acting based on the will of God, if one is talking about
Kant’s conception of God, is not reasonable because a person is doing it because it is the will of
God rather than out of recognition of the moral law. Also, the majority of religious people do not
have a conception of God that aligns with Kant’s, so when they talk about acting based on the
will of God they usually mean that they are acting based on what their religious text says the will
of God is. This conception of God’s will in these religious texts does not necessarily line up with
the highest good. The second major point that Kant makes about where ethics and religion do not
overlap is that duties to God are not a part of ethics (Kant 1996b, 229). It is important to
remember here a point that was made earlier: not all actions are moral actions. This does not
mean that they are immoral, but rather that they are amoral. They do not have moral weight one
way or the other. This is where Kant puts actions—such as following a religious law regarding
when to plant seeds—that are considered duties to God by certain religions. For example, it is
not wrong to pray five times a day, eat symbolic wine and crackers, or abstain from eating pork,
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but those activities are not ethical either. The ritualistic aspects of religion belong in a category
separate from ethics as long as they do not violate the moral law. For example, a religious ritual
that required human sacrifice would be immoral. In addition to clarifying where religion and
ethics are not applicable to each other, Kant also has a theory about where they overlap,
specifically with regard to Christianity.
VI.

Christianity
Kant discusses what he calls impure religious ideals, by which he means religious ideals

that bring people farther away from alignment with the moral rather than closer to it. He divides
religion into two categories “religion of rogation” and “moral religion” (Kant 1996a, 95).
Religion of rogation belongs to the category of impure religious ideals; it promises either that
God will make the practitioner happy without that person having to become a better person, or
that God will make the practitioner a better person without the need of any effort on their part
(Kant 1996a, 95). Conversely, moral religion requires that “to become a better human being,
everyone must do as much as it is in his powers to do; and only then… can he hope that what
does not lie in his power will be made good by cooperation from above” (Kant 1996a, 95). Kant
also argues that, of the mainstream religions, Christianity is the only moral religion under this
definition. It is important to clarify here that Kant is not saying that Christianity is perfectly
aligned with the moral law in the way that it is currently being practiced, or that it is a perfect
religion. Rather, he is saying that it is the closest existing major religion to being a moral religion
because it contains an element of obligation on the part of the believers to be an active
participant in moral development. However, Kant does not believe that people need religion to
be moral. He does not think that people need the cooperation from above that Christianity
provides; it is simply a preferable model of religion to one in which the believer has no part in
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their own moral development. The point that Kant is making here is that the redeeming quality of
Christianity is that it requires a person to take at least some responsibility for their own moral
development. However, the doctrine of salvation through Jesus Christ interferes with this
positive quality of Christianity: which is why Kant proposes that people need to reevaluate the
role of Jesus as a religious figure.
VII.

Jesus
According to Kant, Jesus’s contribution to the world is not as humanity’s savior, but

rather as the archetype of perfect human morality. Kant says regarding Jesus:
That which alone can make a world the object of divine decree and the end of creation is
Humanity (rational being in general as pertaining to the world) in its full moral
perfection, from which happiness follows in the will of the Highest Being directly as
from its supreme condition. - This human being, alone pleasing to God, “is in him from
all eternity”; the idea of him proceeds from God’s being; he is not, therefore, a created
thing but God’s only begotten Son, “the Word” (the Fiat!) through which all other things
are, and without whom nothing that is made would exist (since for him, that is, for a
rational being in the world, as can be thought according to its moral determination,
everything was made.) - “He is the reflection of his glory.” - “In him God loved the
world,” and only in him and through the adoption of his dispositions can we hope “to
become children of God”; etc. (Kant 1996a, 103-4)
The main point that Kant is making with this effusive description of Jesus is that Jesus is the
personified idea of moral perfection. Kant goes on to explain that “it is our universal human duty
to elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection” (Kant 1996a, 104). Kant’s position on Jesus
is essentially that Jesus is our example of moral perfection and that people have a moral
obligation to strive towards this idea of moral perfection. This idea exists in Christianity, and it is
embodied in the call for believers to make themselves more “Christ-like.” However, traditional
Christianity requires more than just a belief in Jesus as an example of moral perfection; it
requires faith in Jesus as a savior. It is this second conception of Jesus that Kant adamantly
objects to. Kant advocates for a “practical faith in this Son of God” (Kant 1996a, 104). This
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practical faith is not faith in the salvific powers of Jesus Christ as the redeemer of humanity,
rather, it is faith that Jesus could achieve moral perfection, even given the limitations of human
nature, demonstrating that moral perfection is possible for the rest of humanity as well; moral
perfection is possible for one’s self. This practical faith is not really faith in Jesus as a deity, it is
a faith in humanity’s capacity for goodness: Jesus is simply the exemplar of it.
Kant’s conception of the purpose of Jesus serves as a reflection of theory on the purpose
of religion more generally. Jesus does not function, according to Kant, to provide salvation for
humans from their moral failing—an escape from moral culpability. In the same way, he posits
that religion should not be used to provide people an escape from moral culpability by promising
them happiness or moral growth without effort on their part. However, Kant does believe that
Jesus serves a purpose by demonstrating what moral perfection would look like and how it can
be achieved. Parallely, religion can serve as a guide for directing people to engage in their own
moral development. Jesus is not necessary to Kant’s theory of religion, and religion (in the
traditional sense of the word) is not necessary to his theory of ethics; however, both serve as a
tool in humanity’s pursuit of moral perfection.
VIII.

Conclusion
The most significant contributions of Kant’s theory of religion can be broken down into

two categories. First, there are the necessary postulates of pure practical reason. In order for
Kant’s ethical theory to be sound, he must posit three things: people are free; they have an
immaterial consciousness that exists after their physical body has perished; and there is a God
that is good, rational, and exists outside of the material world. The second major contribution of
Kant’s religious theory is the idea that the only thing that matters in religion, at least with regard
to morality, is ethics. He uses Christianity and Jesus as examples. He argues that Christianity is a
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useful religion in that it puts some of the burden of moral development on the believer. Jesus
should be valued as a religious figure because he is an example of a morally perfect human
being: one who was able to consistently resist instincts and desire in favor of aligning his will
with the moral law. Ultimately, while Kant must postulate some of the general ideals of religion
(such as an immaterial consciousness and God), religion in the sense of the common usage of the
term (holy books, religious rituals, etc) is not necessary to his theory of ethics.
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Chapter 4: Ideal Religion vs. Religion in Reality
I.

Introduction
In this chapter I will analyze Kant’s religious and ethical philosophy in comparison to

two major religions that may be seen as particularly relevant to his theory: Christianity and
Buddhism. Specifically, this analysis will be looking at two aspects of Kant’s theories in
comparison to the theologies of these religions. First, I will consider the alignment of the
metaphysics of these religions with the necessary postulates of pure practical reason laid out in
Kant’s theory: freedom, immortality, and God. Second, I will look at the purpose of each religion
and the relationship of that religion with individual moral development. In doing this, I will
compare these religions to Kant’s conception of an ideal religion, which serves to cultivate
personal moral development and bring individual’s wills closer to alignment with the moral law.
The first religion that I will analyze in this chapter is Christianity. Christianity is the religion that
Kant discusses extensively in his work and it provides context for how Kant saw his religious
theory in relation to existing dominant religion in his cultural milieu. Additionally, Kant argues
in his works that Christianity is the closest of the major world religions to the ideal religion that
he posits in his philosophy. The analysis of Christianity in this chapter will discuss Kant’s
argument for the superiority of Christianity in comparison to other religions in cultivating moral
virtue, as well as propose reasons why a more nuanced understanding of the conception of
Chrisitanity laid out by Kant in comparison to actual Christian theology makes it clear that
Christianity, as it is generally practiced, does not come close to Kant’s ideal religion.
The second half of this chapter will analyze the relationship between Kant’s ethical
theory and Buddhism. The first part of the section on Buddhism will deal with the way that the
Buddhist conceptions of freedom, rebirth, and karma map onto the Kantian conceptions of
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freedom, immortality, and karma. Buddhism has some significant overlap with Kant
metaphysically, and that overlap will be explored in this chapter, but it is particularly relevant to
a discussion of Kant’s religious theory because the Buddhist conception of the purpose of
religion with regard to personal moral development aligns better with Kant’s conception of the
subject Judeo-Christian religion does. The purpose of this section will be to demonstrate that
although Buddhism is not a perfect replacement for Kant’s ideal religion, it maps onto it quite
nicely.
Ultimately, this chapter will argue that Kant’s distortion of Christianity in order to make it
align with his theory is so far from traditional Christianity that it cannot be reasonably conceived
of as the same religion. While at first glance Judeo-Christian religion may have the upper hand
on Asian religions with regard to alignment with Kant’s metaphysics, a deeper look at Kant’s
necessary principles of pure practical reason will illustrate why this is not the case. Furthermore,
the conception of religion as a tool for individual moral development is much more aligned with
Asian religious practices—specifically Buddhism.
II.

Christianity
Kant posits that the closest existing religion to his ideal religion is Christianity.

Throughout his work on the subject of religion, he argues that Jesus is an example of a perfectly
moral person. Although Kant claims that Christianity is the closest existing religion to his ideal
religion, he poses some major changes to the religion in order to make it fit within his ethical
theory. Most notably, Kant argues that in order for Christianity to be a good fit for his ideal
religion it needs to remove the idea of Jesus as savior and rather view Jesus simply as an
example of an ideal moral person. My argument in this chapter will discuss two significant
concepts within Kant’s philosophy: the necessary postulates of pure practical reason and
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religion’s role in cultivating an individual's moral virtue. First, I will argue that, while on the
surface it may seem like Christianity fulfills Kant’s necessary postulates of pure practical reason,
it actually falls short with regard to the concepts of freedom and immortality. Additionally, I will
argue that when Kant attempts to separate the cultivation of moral virtue from the issue of
salvation he is fundamentally misunderstanding the relationship between justification and
sanctification in Christian theology.
A. Necessary Postulates of Pure Practical Reason
In The Critique of Practical Reason Kant posits that there are three assumptions that one
must make in order for metaphysics to be consistent with his ethical theory. He calls these
assumptions the necessarily postulates of pure practical reason and they are: freedom,
immortality, and God. Generally, the scholarly consensus has been that Christian theology fulfills
these three requirements through its conception of free will, an eternal soul, and an
anthropomorphized God. The issue of God is quite straightforward, so I will pass over it quickly
here; Christian theology lines up quite well with Kant regarding God—both postulate a God that
is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. For my purposes, there is no need to further
analyze these descriptions of God since they function to achieve the same thing, so I will
concede that Christianity and the other Abrahamic religions are the most spot on with regard to
Kant’s conception of God. It is the two other necessary postulates of pure practical reason that I
will take issue with in this chapter. My argument will focus on the conception of heaven and hell
in Christian theology.2 First, I will argue that the conception of heaven and hell may allow for the
conception of free will that is proliferated in Christian theology, however, it does not allow for

2

It is worth noting that there is a developing strand of modern liberal Christian theology that rejects the doctrine of
heaven and hell. However, that strand is far from being dominant today and certainly would have had little to no
influence in Kant’s time. Given that this is not a thesis on Christian theology, I will limit my arguments to
discussions of mainstream or traditional Christian doctrine.
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the conception of autonomy that Kant puts forth in his philosophy. Second, I will argue that a
conception of the afterlife in which one is doomed to heaven or hell based on the actions that
they committed during their life runs completely contrary to the purpose for which Kant posits a
theory of immortality. The point of all of this will be to demonstrate that while it may be easy to
assume that Christianity lines up with Kant based on the prominent issue of God, ultimately a
more nuanced understanding of both Kant and Christian theology shows that this is not the case.
Kant argues that freedom is central to his religious and ethical theory because in order to
hold someone accountable, either positively or negatively, for their ethical choices they must
make these choices without being constrained by any external forces. It is only when they are
able to make decisions on the basis of their reason, rather than external constraints, that they are
truly free and able to truly act morally by aligning their own will with the moral law. This
conception of freedom is called autonomy. At first, it may seem like the Christian conception of
free will is the same thing; however, that is actually not the case. Free will allows for actors to
make use of their reason to make semi-rational choices, but those choices are still constrained by
the circumstances in which they find themselves. Kant must admit that people are constrained by
their circumstances (this issue will be addressed more thoroughly in the section on immortality)
but he grants people a modified level of culpability as a result of this impairment. Christianity
does not do this, it judges people worthy of heaven or hell based on the assumption of full moral
culpability in a form of existence that severely limits their potential for true autonomy. This is
only the first issue. The second issue is that the doctrine of heaven and hell in Christianity
creates an additional form of external constraint that prevents people from being able to act
morally. Remember, according to Kant, one must do the right thing for the right reason. When
people act morally within Christianity in order to be rewarded by heaven or to avoid being
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punished in hell, they are not acting morally out of a sense of duty to uphold what is right, they
are acting morally on the basis of some external constraint. One might respond to my argument
by saying that God knows why people are acting morally, because He is omniscient, so no one
will be able to get away with acting morally simply based on the motivation of heaven or hell. I
have two responses to this. First, Christian doctrine does not specify that one cannot be
motivated to profess faith on the basis of heaven or hell. Arguably, this is an evangelizing
technique that is often utilized by the church in order to grow its numbers. Second, it is
impossible for a being to not be motivated or influenced by the fate of their eternal soul. If one
believes the doctrine to be true, it is human nature that it would be an issue of the utmost
importance. The intentions or moral fortitude of the individual person are irrelevant, the nature of
the structure of a religion that has a conception of heaven and hell inherently limits people’s
autonomy. James Haring, a scholar who specializes in both Christian theology and Immanuel
Kant, argues a similar point when he says:
... religious law seems to appeal for justification to the inclinations or happiness of agents
by means of rewards and punishments. This means that religious law motivates not by
reason alone, but by the potential effects of obedience to it… religious law is not always
universal. Much of what one finds in jewish and christian religious law, for example,
appears to be contingent. It depends on specific historical circumstances, cultural
traditions, theological presuppositions, divine revelation, or some combination of these; it
is not accessible to all persons. Much religious law is therefore “heteronomous” in that
(1) its authority comes from threats of punishment or promises of reward and (2) it is
issued by a lawgiver whose commandments are not coextensive with the a priori and
universal moral law. For Kant, conversely, the moral law must be “autonomous,” that is,
it must be self-legislated by the practical reason of an agent (her Wille) to that agent’s
capacity for arbitrary choice (her Willkür). That autonomous self-legislation involves
giving the principles that guide one’s actions (what Kant calls “maxims”) the form of
universal law (much as the a priori categories of the understanding grant intelligible form
to sensory intuitions in Kant’s epistemology). When religious law is not autonomous in
Kant’s sense and yet claims that obedience to it is commanded by and satisfying to some
deity, it possesses an especially insidious form of heteronomy. (Haring 2020, 74-75)
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Haring actually makes two important points here. The first is that, in both Christianity and
Judaism, external constraints are intentionally and explicitly used in order to motivate people to
act morally. This is the exact opposite of the way Kant argues an ideal religion should motivate
moral behavior on the part of behaviors. Rather than cultivate autonomy and moral decision
making capabilities it squashes people’s own moral capacities by making them secondary to the
more immediate promise of reward or threat of punishment. The second point that Haring makes
is that in both Christianity and Judaism the supposed moral law is not universal or reasonable:
reasonable here meaning that it can be figured out through the use of reason alone. The moral
law is specific to certain groups, places, times, etc. and many of the laws are practical (in a
utilitarian way) at best and downright arbitrary at worst. A religion with a conception of eternal
pleasure or eternal torment as reward or punishment for ethical behavior cannot possibly even
allow for autonomy, much less cultivate it. Thus, Christianity is an abysmal ethical failure with
regard to the Kantian conception of freedom. The concepts of heaven and hell continue to create
problems for the relationship between Kant and Christianity when evaluating his conception of
immortality.
Kant argues that one of the necessary postulates of pure practical reason is immortality.
The reasons for this are essentially twofold: immortality allows for people to act completely
autonomously without the restrictions of the material world and immortality gives people the
time that they need in order to make the necessary moral development toward aligning their own
will with the moral law. Kant emphasizes the value of immortality by pointing out that the
human lifespan is finite (limited time) and that existence in the material world puts a large
number of external constraints on people (limited autonomy). The Christian conception of
immortality poses the existence of an immortal consciousness, or soul, that is judged at the end
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of one’s life based on their morality during their worldly existence and then sentenced to heaven
or hell for all eternity. Outside of the existence of an immortal consciousness, these two
conceptions of immortality are nothing alike; the Christian conception of immortality does not
resolve any of the problems that Kant aims to use immortality to solve. In fact, it makes the
problems of limited time to become morally good and limited autonomy even worse by judging
people for all eternity despite those constraints. Kant needs immortality in order to allow people
time to align their will with the moral law, because the human lifespan is so short. If people are
sentenced to heaven or hell as soon as they die, they are never given the opportunity to develop
their morality further. Neither eternal paradise nor eternal torment are environments conducive to
moral development. Additionally, Kant posits that people need immortality in order to become
moral because they cannot become fully moral during their worldly existence because of the
autonomy-limiting restrictions of a biological existence. The Christian conception of heaven and
hell, even if it was based on morality and not people’s acceptance of Jesus, would doom them all
to hell. The Christian conception of immortality, because it is based on the idea of heaven and
hell, fails to serve any of the functions for which Kant posits immortality, so it is not a sufficient
parallel.
Finally, with regard to both the issues of freedom and immortality, the Christian
conception of heaven and hell is not actually based on whether or not someone is moral, it is
based on whether or not they profess faith in the salvific power of Jesus Christ. Kant attempts to
resolve this rather daunting issue by arguing that we ought to separate the part of Christianity
that talks about Jesus as savior from the part of Christianity that talks about Jesus as a moral
person. In other words, Kant wants to eliminate the salvation part of Christianity and keep the
ethics part. The problem with this, as I will argue in the next section, is that because the role of
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Jesus as savior is foundational to the Christian faith, there is no way to achieve the ethical
benefits of Christianity without the salvation part. This is not to say that it is impossible
according to Christianity to act ethically without being saved (a non-believer can still refrain
from killing, give to the poor, etc.), but rather that Christianity only has some type of special
influence on the desire and motivation of a person to be ethical as a result of the process of
salvation; if that is eliminated, then the role of Christiantiy in contributing to the development of
an ethical person is defunct. Christianity only promotes moral development at a level that is
higher than other religions or higher than the general population because of the transformational
powers of salvation. You cannot eliminate salvation from Christianity and maintain the “fruits of
the spirit” that come from salvation.
B. Cultivating Ethical People
Kant’s position that Christianity is the closest existing religion to his ideal religion is
grounded on a conception of Christianity that he puts forward in which Jesus is viewed as an
example of a perfectly moral person rather than as the savior. This conception of Christianity
creates a number of problems. Most obviously, a religion in which Jesus Christ is not positioned
in the role of savior cannot really be called Christianity in the traditional sense. The role of Jesus
as savior is the cornerstone of the Christian religion. Although the point certainly needs to be
made, a criticism of Kant’s theory merely on that point would be rather asinine, as it is obvious
to anyone with even a basic knowledge of Christian theology. The more nuanced point that I will
be making in this section is that even if removing Jesus as savior was not an issue simply as a
theological point, it would still render Kant’s attempt at co-opting the rest of the religion
ineffective. Kant believes that Christianity without the salvation aspect is the closest religion to
his ideal religion because it requires that believers go through a process of making themselves
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better people. In traditional Christian doctrine, this process is referred to as sanctification. The
problem with Kant’s conception of Christianity is that he views sanctification as something that
can be separated from salvation; the process of salvation is referred to in Christian doctrine as
justification. In this section I will argue that sanctification can only be achieved in Christianity as
a result of justification, and thus the supposed ethical value of sanctification in Christianity
becomes irrelevant when Kant proposes a version of Christianity that eliminates the doctrine of
salvation.
In order to understand the relationship between justification and sanctification in
Christianity it is first important to understand what each of these terms mean. Theologian
Andrew Snider explains that “justification is a legal term that is used in the NT to describe how a
sinner is made acceptable to God. In salvation, God declares a sinner to be righteous—a
consideration that begins in his own character and is accomplished by his own action” (Snider
2010, 2). In the previous quotation the word “his”' refers to God and not to the sinner. In simple
terms, justification can be understood as the process of someone being made holy through
salvation. Of course, this conception is based on the idea of Jesus dying on the cross being the
means of salvation. Alternatively, there is the concept of sanctification. When explaining
sanctification Snider states that “although God’s people have been marked out by him to be
separate from the rest of the world, and even though this is an objective reality, God’s people are
commanded to live accordingly: ‘You shall be holy to me, for I the LORD am holy and have
separated you from the peoples, that you should be mine’ (Lev 20:26; cf. 19:2; 1 Pet 1:15-16)”
(Snider 2010, 18). Sanctification is the process of people acting more ethically in order to
become holier. At first glance, it seems obvious why Kant would think the process of
sanctification is similar to his idea of how an ideal religion would work. People have to put in
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work in order to become more holy, i.e. align themselves with God’s will, which–since Kant’s
conception of God is a being whose will is completely aligned with the moral law–is the moral
law. However, what Kant’s understanding of the topic is missing is the relationship between
sanctification and justification. This relationship is key to the Christian conception of ethics, and
thus is important to any philosophical account that values sanctification as a means of qualifying
Christianity’s ethical value. Snider explains the relationship between justification and
sanctification when he says:
God, who is righteous in himself and is the normative standard of righteousness, lovingly
provides his Son as a substitute for unrighteous sinners so that they can be made
acceptable to him. This substitute lives a sinless life in obedience to the Father, qualifying
himself to be the perfect sacrifice and high priest on behalf of sinners. Offering himself as
the spotless Lamb of God, he is put forward by the Father as the propitiating sacrifice
which is made available to sinners who may appropriate this sacrifice for themselves in
faith. Upon exercise of this faith, they are united to the Son by the Father so completely
that he considers the Son’s efficacious death to be that of those who actually deserved it.
The result is that the Father, the God who is righteous, sees those sinners as having his
own righteousness, because he sees them in his divine Son. The sinner is justified. Now,
because he is at peace with God, because he is accepted by God, because the penalty of
sin has been paid and the power of sin has been broken, the justified sinner is expected to
live as a growing testimony to the reality of God’s righteous, redemptive love and
presence in the world. This process is called sanctification. (Snider 2010, 14-15)
The point that Snider is making here is two-fold. First, it is true that the process of sanctification
requires conscious work on the part of the believer. In this sense, the doctrine of sanctification
does not commit what Kant calls religion's biggest error: saying that God will make someone
ethical without any work on the part of that person. However, Snider also clearly explains that
the process of sanctification can only happen as the result of changes that happen in the person
because of salvation. The person may have to put in work to become once they are saved, but
according to Christianity the only way for them to become motivated to put in that work is
through salvation. The role of Jesus as savior is at the very core of the Christian faith, and the
cultivation of moral virtue that comes post-salvation is a secondary issue in the religion. A
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necessary assumption of Christianity is that people are not able to become good on their own,
they are inherently sinful and they need salvation to ever move past that sinfulness. In Kantian
terms, without salvation people will always be slaves to their instincts. It is only through
salvation that people become free enough to even have the choice to use their moral reasoning.
They do have to make that choice, it is not made for them, but the choice is not available without
salvation. In Christianity, morality is impossible without salvation. In this way, at least with
regard to the ethical value of Christianity, Kant very well might have been better off leaving the
role of Jesus as savior in the religion. That would create other problems, as both Kant and the
previous section of this chapter discusses, but Kant’s solution of eliminating the salvific role of
Jesus leaves Christianity ethically castrated.
Christianity, at least as it is traditionally practiced, has very little alignment with Kant’s
theory of an ideal religion outside of the fact that it happened to be the dominant religion in
Germany at the time in which Kant was writing his philosophy. The Christian conception of God
lines up with the Kantian conception of God quite well; however, this is where the important
metaphysical similarities end. The Christian doctrine of heaven and hell makes the religion
unsuitable to fulfill two of Kant’s necessary postulates of pure practical reason: freedom and
immortality. Kant’s conception of freedom is arguably one of the most important assumptions of
his ethical theory, so this incompatibility poses a major issue. Additionally, Jesus serves as an
example of an ideal person in both Christianity and Kant’s ethical theory; however, even the role
of Jesus varies dramatically between the two. In Christianity, Jesus’s primary function is as the
savior of humanity. In Kant’s ideal religion, Jesus does not perform any salvific function, but is
rather an example of the kind of moral behavior that one should aspire to. Kant’s conception of
Christianity in which the salvific function of Jesus is separated from the moral betterment of
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believers fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between justification and sanctification
in Christianity. In conclusion, Christianity misses the mark with regard to being Kant’s ideal
religion both metaphysically and ethically. The next section of this chapter will discuss
Buddhism which, while not able to perfectly match on to Kant’s theory of ideal religion, is a
much better match than Christianity.
III.

Buddhism
Immanuel Kant, being a German living in the eighteenth century, would have had little to

no knowledge of the religion of Buddhism. Nonetheless, Buddhism actually aligns quite well
with Kant’s conception of an ideal religion; particularly with regard to the central aim of religion
being to cultivate moral virtue. The primary focus on Buddhism is achieving enlightenment, so
the other aspects of the religions are all focused toward helping an individual to achieve this
internal self-betterment. Buddhism does not have rituals or practices that are done arbitrarily or
for the purpose of worshiping some deity. This section of this chapter will explore how
Buddhism aligns with Kant both metaphysically and ethically. At first, it is difficult to conceive
of how an Asian religion that is operating from a very different starting point could align with the
metaphysics of a philosopher whose theory is rooted in Judeo-Christian conceptions of
metaphysics. However, when looking at the function of Kant’s necessary postulates of pure
practical reason–rather then the specific terminology that he would have been predisposed to use
given the time and place in which he was writing–it is clear that concepts in Buddhism can
mostly fill the requirements of those postulates from a functional perspective. Ethically,
Buddhism and Kant’s theory of religion share a fundamental focus on personal moral
development.
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The most fundamental teaching of Buddhism is the four noble truths: all conditioned
phenomena are suffering, all suffering arises as a result of craving, to end suffering one must end
craving, and the path to ending suffering is to the eightfold path. Due to the idea that all
conditioned phenomena are suffering, the ultimate goal of Buddhism is to escape the cycle of
birth and rebirth by achieving nirvana. However, this only happens through enlightenment. A
lesser aim in Buddhism is to have a positive rebirth.
Samsara is the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. In Buddhism, a being has either a good
rebirth or a bad rebirth based on their karma in their past life. In Buddhism, karma is the idea that
“beings are reborn according to the nature and quality of their actions” (Harvey 2000, 14-15).
Karma is viewed as “a natural law inherent in the nature of things, like a law of physics” (Harvey
2000, 16). Good actions result in a good rebirth and bad actions result in a bad rebirth. The idea
of karma in Buddhism is distinct from the idea of karma in some other religions because the
focus is on how ethical actions affect one’s karma, rather than how ritualistic actions affect one's
karma. Additionally, the Buddhist idea of karma emphasizes the idea that the motives for actions,
not just the actions themselves, are important.
One final concept in Buddhism that is particularly relevant when comparing it to Kant’s
ethical theory is the idea of the impermanent self. Buddhism views sentient beings (including
humans) as interrelated processes of momentary events, i.e., a set of changing causally
interconnected mental and physical processes, wherein the constantly changing mental stream is
the primary connecting thread between rebirths (Harvey 2000, 33). So Buddhism's key idea
regarding the self is the conception of "no-self" or "absence of self"--that there is no permanent,
unchanging self or soul as the essence of a sentient being. One way to think of this is as a stream
of consciousness that is continually changing as it goes through different experiences. This

46
concept has important ethical ramifications in Buddhism because it rejects the idea that any
being is too evil to ever be changed or become moral (Harvey 2000, 34). This conception of the
self in Buddhism stands in stark contrast to the more traditional conception of the self as a
unified and unchanging consciousness. A common term for this latter conception of the self is
the soul.
A. Necessary Postulates of Pure Practical Reason
The idea of freedom is where Buddhism and Kant’s ethical theory overlap the most. In
Kant’s ethical theory freedom is a necessary property of the will. The conception of freedom that
Kant defines here is a negative one, freedom is the lack of being constrained by one’s desires.
Kant’s conception of desire is very similar to the Buddhist conception of craving. Both of these
concepts refer to the idea that there is something besides the rules of ethics that often controls
people’s behavior. Additionally, both Kant and Buddhism advocate that part of achieving
morality is being able to eliminate these external desires or cravings. Buddhism has the idea that
suffering is caused by craving and that in order to escape suffering one needs to eliminate
craving. This is fundamentally also a conception of freedom defined in the negative, as the lack
of being controlled by desire, although in the case of Buddhism it is called enlightenment.
The Kantian and Buddhist conceptions of immortality are similar in that they both hold
the idea that people can become moral if they are given enough time. Kant has a conception of a
unified soul that says that people are always making progress toward aligning their will with the
moral law. And Buddhism says that because people are always changing, no one should be
completely written off as immoral, they are always capable of positive change (Harvey 2000,
34). Additionally, Buddhism argues that every being is capable of eventually achieving
enlightenment. Thus, both Buddhism and Kant have a conception of immortality that helps
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people make progress toward moral perfection. Notably, immortality in both serves the purpose
of allowing people to make moral progress that they were not able to make within their finite
moral life. Additionally, the Buddhist conception of the self encourages people to detach from
the limits of their current worldly body by realizing that it is not ultimately significant, which
serves the purpose of granting people autonomy from external constraints in a way similar to
Kant’s conception of immortality freeing one’s consciousness from the limitation of their worldly
bodies. One notable difference between Buddhism and Kant is that Kant’s conception of
immortality is based on the idea of one continuous self. Although this may seem like a problem,
it is really not key to the function of immortality as a necessary postulate of pure practical
reason. Rather, it is simply a result of the fact that the only conception of an immortal self that
Kant would have been exposed to would have been a soul, he would not have known about a
conception of immortality in the sense of continuity of a changing mental stream. Buddhism
does not have a conception of the self, it has a conception that is more akin to a continuous
stream of consciousness. However, this ever changing stream of consciousness serves the
functions of immortality by giving people time to morally develop and by detaching them from
the constraints of the material world. In fact, the Buddhist conception of the self allows for much
more change and autonomy than the traditional idea of the soul does.
At first, it may seem impossible to reconcile Kant’s conception of God with Buddhism. In
Buddhism, the overarching force in the universe is karma, and karma is a law of nature, not an
anthropomorphized deity. However, it is important to understand that Kant’s ethical theory is not
really committed to his idea of God. Kant postulates God because he needs something
omniscient to be able to tell if people are acting morally for the right reason. Karma can account
for this because the laws of karma take into account intention. Karma is a superior necessary
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postulate of pure practical reason because it solves Kant’s need for God. The rest of the
characteristics of God that Kant proposes are those things that would have to be true about God if
there is a God. However, if he is able to solve his accountability problem without having to
postulate God then the rest of those characteristics are not necessary.
Despite the initial surface level differences between Buddhist ethics and Kant’s ethical
theory, Buddhism and Kant’s ideal religion ultimately aim for the same goal, in the same way,
with similar (although notably not identical) metaphysical assumptions. Kant’s ethical theory and
Buddhism have a very similar conception of freedom, and this is really key to their similarity.
Both systems conceive of freedom as autonomy, or lack of external constraints. The goal of both
is to be able to act completely free of these external constraints, and this is achieved through
continuous self cultivation in the pursuit of freedom. The specific practices of this self
cultivation might look different—e.g., Kant probably had little conception of the idea of
meditation—but the goal is the same. Additionally, the concept of rebirth in Buddhism can be
substituted quite nicely for Kant’s conception of immortality. Finally, although it is not as perfect
of a match as the Abrahamic God, the Buddhist conception of karma can fulfill the basic
function that Kant’s God does. Buddhism does not perfectly align with Kant’s ideal religion with
regard to metaphysics; however, its differences are not as significant as one might think.
Specifically, Buddhism lines up very well with Kant’s most fundamental postulate of freedom.
This, coupled with the Buddhist conception of individual moral development discussed in the
next section, illustrates that Buddhism is a much better candidate for Kant’s ideal religion than
Christiantiy.
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B. Cultivating Ethical People
The comparison of Kant’s ideal religion to Buddhism with regard to the issue of
cultivating morality is not complicated. Kant argues that the focus of religion ought to be helping
people align their wills with the moral law. Religion ought to help people do this because that is
the point of human existence. Buddhism is a religion that is focused on helping people achieve
enlightenment. Notably, alignment of one’s will with the moral law and enlightenment are not
the exact same thing on the surface. However, the focus of both concepts is fundamentally the
same. Alignment of one’s will with the moral law both consist of and are the result of complete
freedom from instinctual desire. One is only able to align their will with the moral law once they
are no longer willing lesser things. Similarly, enlightenment both consist of and is the result of
complete freedom from craving. The summum bonum of both Kant’s ideal religion and
Buddhism, although phrased and conceived of quite differently, boils down to simply freedom.
Furthermore, the path to achieving the summum bonum in both is by consciously putting in
effort to make oneself more free in pursuit of that final goal. Buddhism may use methods such as
meditation that Kant would not have been very aware of, but such methods are not in conflict
with his theory. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both Kant and Buddhism posit that what
the final goal is, the path to achieving it, and the moral rules to follow along the way are innate
and accessible to people. In other words, people can figure out Buddhism or Kant’s ethical
theory just by thinking about what the right thing is. Neither religion requires holy texts, priests,
or elaborate rituals in order to follow it. This is not the case with other religions such as Judaism
or Christianity. For example, people do not have an innate sense that eating pork, wearing mixed
linens, or not going to Mass on Sunday is wrong. However, people do have an innate sense that
murder is wrong. Buddhism and Kant’s ideal religion are most alike in their lack of
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“religiousness.” The core point of Kant’s theory of religion is that you do not really need to have
religion, in the traditional sense of the word, in order to be ethical; but if you are going to have a
religion it ought to be one that helps you be more ethical, not one that focuses on deity worship
or abstract rituals. Christianity may result in being ethical as a secondary effect of the religion,
but in Buddhism being ethical is the only way to practice the religion. That does not mean that
Buddhists never act immorally, it simply means that there are no other obligations in Buddhism
that come before being ethical. One does not need to “believe in the Buddha” in order to achieve
enlightenment in Buddhism. Although Kant may not have known about Buddhism, Buddhism is
the closest that any mainstream religion has come to Kant’s ideal religion. In fact, the lack of
shared exposure between the two proves both Kant’s and Buddhism’s point, the path to freedom
is accessible to all if one simply puts in the effort to think about it.
IV.

Conclusion
Kant argues that Christianity is the closest existing religion to his ideal religion. This

section has illustrated that his claim is mistaken both because Christianity does not align well
with his ideal religion and because Buddhism would be a much more suitable alternative. The
first section of this chapter argued that Christiantiy does not align with Kant’s ideal religion both
metaphysically and ethically. While the conception of God is similar in Christianity and Kant’s
ideal religion, the conception of heaven and hell outlined in Christian doctrine does not align
well with Kant’s postulates of freedom and immortality. Ethically, Kant posits a revised
conception of Christinaity in order to make it better align with his ideal religion, but his
conception fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between justification and
sanctification in Christianity. The second section of this chapter posited that Buddhism would be
a better religion to compare to Kant’s ideal religion. The Buddhist conception of karma can
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loosely take the place of the Kantian idea of God, rebirth can take the place of immortality,
and–most importantly–Buddhism has a very similar conception of freedom to that which Kant
postulates. Additionally, both Kant’s and Buddhism’s theories of ethics are rooted in cultivating
moral betterment through conscious efforts to make oneself more free. The dominant religion of
Kant’s time and place was Christianity, and he would have had little to no access to Buddhism;
however, the limitations of the historical circumstances of Kant need not be imposed on those
who critically study his ethical and religious theories today. Perhaps, if Kant would have lived in
a time where he was both exposed to Buddhism and would not have feared retribution for
blasphemy, he would have viewed Buddhism as the closest the world has gotten to realizing his
ideal religion.
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